We answer an open question about Quantum Key Recycling (QKR): Is it possible to put the message entirely in the qubits without increasing the number of qubits? We show that this is indeed possible. We introduce a prepare-and-measure QKR protocol where the communication from Alice to Bob consists entirely of qubits. As usual, Bob responds with an authenticated one-bit accept/reject classical message. 1 Compared to Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), QKR has reduced round complexity. Compared to previous qubit-wise QKR protocols, our scheme has far less classical communication. We provide a security proof in the universal composability framework and find that the communication rate is asymptotically the same as for QKD with one-way postprocessing.
Outline
In Section 2 we introduce notation and briefly review post-selection and the results of [5] . We state our motivation in Section 3, and we list the steps of the proposed protocol in Section 4. Section 5 presents a stepwise re-formulation of the protocol which is equivalent in terms of security but better suited to the proof technique. In Section 6 we derive the output state of the protocol, and in Section 7 we give the security proof. We conclude with a discussion and suggestions for future work.
Preliminaries

Notation and terminology
Classical Random Variables (RVs) are denoted with capital letters, and their realisations with lowercase letters. The probability that a RV X takes value x is written as Pr[X = x]. The expectation with respect to RV X is denoted as E x f (x) = x∈X Pr[X = x]f (x). Sets are denoted in calligraphic font. The notation 'log' stands for the logarithm with base 2. The notation h stands for the binary entropy function h(p) = p log 1 p +(1−p) log 1 1−p . Sometimes we write h({p 1 , . . . , p k }) meaning i p i log 1 pi . Bitwise XOR of binary strings is written as '⊕'. The Kronecker delta is denoted as δ ab . The complement of a bit b ∈ {0, 1} is written asb = 1 − b. The Hamming weight of a binary string x is written as |x|. We will speak about 'the bit error rate γ of a quantum channel'. This is defined as the probability that a classical bit g, sent by Alice embedded in a qubit, arrives at Bob's side asḡ. We write 1 for the identity matrix.
For quantum states we use Dirac notation. A qubit state with classical bit x encoded in basis b is written as |ψ b
x . We call x the payload. We will always assume that we are working with 6-state encoding (known from 6-state QKD, with three possible bases) or 8-state encoding [9, 10] . Occasionally we will comment if a result is different for BB84-encoding. The notation 'tr' stands for trace. Let A have eigenvalues λ i . The 1-norm of A is written as A 1 = tr √ A † A = i |λ i |. The trace distance between matrices ρ and σ is denoted as δ(ρ; σ) = 1 2 ||ρ − σ|| 1 . It is a generalisation of the statistical distance and represents the maximum possible advantage one can have in distinguishing ρ from σ. Quantum states with non-italic label 'A', 'B' and 'E' indicate the subsystem of Alice/Bob/Eve. Consider uniform classical variables X, Y and a quantum system under Eve's control that depends on X and Y . The combined classical-quantum state is ρ XY E = E xy |xy xy| ⊗ ρ E xy . The state of a sub-system is obtained by tracing out all the other subspaces, e.g. ρ Y E = tr X ρ XY E = E y |y y|⊗ρ E y , with ρ E y = E x ρ E xy . The fully mixed state on Hilbert space H A is denoted as χ A . The security of the variable X, given that Eve holds the 'E' subsystem, can be expressed in terms of a trace distance as follows [11] ,
i.e. the distance between the true classical-quantum state and a state in which X is completely unknown to Eve. We write S(H A ) to denote the space of density matrices on the Hilbert space H A . Any quantum channel can be described by a completely positive trace-preserving (CPTP) map E : S(H A ) → S(H B ) that transforms a mixed state ρ A to ρ B : E(ρ A ) = ρ B . For a map E : S(H A ) → S(H B ), the notation E(ρ AC ) stands for (E ⊗ 1 C )(ρ AC ), i.e. E acts only on the A subsystem. The diamond norm of E is defined as E = 1 2 sup ρ AC ∈S(HAC) E(ρ AC ) 1 with H C an auxiliary system that can be considered to be of the same dimension as H A . The diamond norm E − E can be used to upper bound the probability of distinguishing two CPTP maps E and E given that the process is observed once. The maximum probability of a correct guess is 1 2 + 1 4 E − E . The security of a protocol is often quantified by the diamond norm between the real protocol E and an protocol with ideal functionality F. When E − F ≤ ε we can consider E to behave ideally except with probability ε; this security metric is composable with other (sub-)protocols [12] . A family of hash functions H = {h : X → T } is called pairwise independent (a.k.a. 2-independent or strongly universal) [13] if for all distinct pairs x, x ∈ X and all pairs y, y ∈ T it holds that Pr h∈H [h(x) = y ∧ h(x ) = y ] = |T | −2 . Here the probability is over random h ∈ H. Pairwise independence can be achieved with a hash family of size |H| = |X |.
Definition of QKR rate and security
We define the rate of a quantum communication protocol as the number of useful message bits communicated per sent qubit. Informally, we define QKR security as follows. Let k denote all the shared keys of Alice and Bob in the current instantiation of the protocol. Letk be the keys in the next instantiation, computed in a way that depends on Bob's feedback. We define the Key Recycling property as follows,
• If Bob's feedback message is Accept, thenk is computed without tapping into new key material. 4 Two security properties must be satisfied:
• Even if Eve intercepts the whole ciphertext, she cannot obtain any information about the message.
• Usingk in the next instantiation does not endanger any message.
Formally, we work with an EPR-state based version of the protocol. We consider a quantumclassical state ρ KKM ΩE containing the classical random variables K,K, M, Ω, where M is the message and Ω is Bob's feedback bit, as well as Eve's quantum side information (the subsystem denoted as 'E'). This state is the result of the protocol E acting on an input state σ which represents the noisy EPR pairs prepared by Eve, ρ KKM ΩE = E(σ). An 'ideal' version of the protocol is denoted as F, and we write ϕ KKM ΩE = F(σ). It satisfies ϕ M ΩE = ϕ M ⊗ ϕ ΩE and ϕK M ΩE = ϕK ⊗ ϕ M ΩE . The first equation expresses the fact that the message M is entirely decoupled from the subsystems available to Eve. The second says that, even in the case of known plaintext, Eve has no information about the updated keyK. We say that the QKR scheme E is ε-secure if E − F ≤ ε.
Post-selection
For protocols that are invariant under permutation of their inputs it has been shown [14] that security against collective attacks (the same attack applied to each qubit individually) implies security against general attacks, at the cost of extra privacy amplification. Let E be a protocol that acts on S(H ⊗n AB ) and let F describe the perfect functionality of that protocol. If for all permutations π on the input there exists a map K π on the output such that E • π = K π • E then,
where d is the dimension of the H AB space. (d = 4 for qubits). The product form σ ⊗n greatly simplifies the security analysis: now it suffices to prove security against 'collective' attacks, and to pay a price 2(d 2 − 1) log(n + 1) in the amount of privacy amplification, i.e. the output size of the privacy amplification step is reduced by this amount.
Brief summary of results from [5]
It was shown that the asymptotic communication rate of QKR is the same as the rate of QKD with one-way postprocessing. Alice encodes random bits into the qubits; over a classical channel she sends a ciphertext, OTP-encrypted information for error-correction, and an authentication tag. Let the CPTP map E be the protocol of [5] , and F its idealized version where the message and the next round's keys are completely unknown to Eve. It was shown that
where λ is the length of the authentication tags, ε the amount of state 'smoothing' [11] , n the number of qubits, B the alphabet of the qubit basis choice, the message length, B the basis sequence, S the random data encoded in the qubits, and P corr the noise-dependent probability of successful error correction. Theρ BSE is the state E(σ ⊗n ) (see Section 2.3) smoothened by an amount ε, with everything traced out except the B, S and E subsystems. If 6-state encoding 5 of bits is used then the 4 × 4 matrix σ is completely determined [15] by a single parameter: the bit error probability γ on the quantum channel. Asymptotically for large n, the bound (3) reduces to
which yields exactly the same rate 6 
) as 6-state QKD with one-way postprocessing. 7 The security of N QKR rounds follows from E N • · · · • E 1 − F N • · · · • F 1 ≤ N E − F .
Motivation
As mentioned in Section 1, current QKR schemes all have some drawback. Either they require a quantum computer for their implementation or they have classical ciphertext. In this work we aim for a QKR protocol that has all the desiderata one would expect: 5 For 4-state (BB84) 'conjugate' coding Eve has two degrees of freedom, i.e. a more powerful attack. 6 The term nh(γ) gets cancelled because Alice and Bob expend nh(γ) bits of key material to OTP the redundancy bits.
7 For 4-state encoding the result is different from (4) and yields the BB84 rate.
• All actions on quantum states should be simple single-qubit actions like state preparation and measurement.
• Alice should send only qubits, so that no bandwidth is wasted.
• Bob should send only an authenticated Accept/Reject bit.
• No key material should be consumed in case of Accept, and the bare minimum 8 should be consumed in case of Reject.
• The communication rate should equal that of QKD.
Our Quantum Key Recycling protocol 4.1 Protocol design considerations
Our protocol is very similar to [5] . There are two main differences:
1. There is no classical communication from Alice to Bob.
2. In case of Reject the keys are not thrown away. Instead, fresh key material is hashed into the old keys to obtain the keys for the next round.
In the transformation from [5] to a protocol without classical ciphertext, there are several prooftechnical issues. Most importantly, the qubit payload X ∈ {0, 1} n needs to be uniformly random.
(See Section 5.3. In the proof the X acts as a uniform mask.) This has to be reconciled with the fact that (i) the message is typically not uniform; (ii) the error-correction encoding step introduces redundancy. Our solution to these issues is shown in Fig. 1 , which depicts most of the variables in the protocol. Alice first appends a random string r ∈ {0, 1} κ to the message, which will serve for privacy amplification. Then she does the error correction encoding, resulting in a codeword c ∈ {0, 1} n . The c is then masked with a one-time pad z; this masks any structure present in c. A similar construction was proposed by Gottesman [8] . However, instead of discarding z we re-use most of the entropy in z. 9 The λ is a security parameter for the MAC function and is constant with respect to n. Alice's plaintext is µ ∈ {0, 1} −2λ . The key material shared between Alice and Bob consists of a mask z ∈ {0, 1} n , a MAC key ξ ∈ {0, 1} λ for Alice's message, a basis sequence b ∈ B n , a MAC key k ∈ {0, 1} λ for Bob's feedback bit, and seeds u ∈ U, v ∈ V for pairwise independent hashing. 10 Furthermore Alice and Bob have a 'reservoir' of additional spare key material.
One round of the protocol consists of the following steps (see 
Protocol reformulation for the security proof
We introduce a sequence of small modifications to the protocol of Section 4. While the original protocol E orig in Section 4 is the one that Alice and Bob actually execute, we will write down the security proof for the modified protocol E mod . Due to their (almost-)equivalence, security of E mod implies security of E orig up to a constant 2 −λ+1 .
• We mask the qubit payload with public randomness.
• We go to an EPR version in order to apply standard proof methods.
• We add random permutation of the qubits so that post-selection can be used.
• We add random Pauli transforms in order to simplify the noisy state.
• We pretend that the two authentication tags cannot be forged.
Masking the qubit payload with public randomness
Alice picks a random string a ∈ {0, 1} n . She computes s = x ⊕ a. Instead of qubit states |ψ bi xi she prepares |ψ bi si . We denote Bob's measurement result as t ∈ {0, 1} n . Alice publishes a over an authenticated channel. 11 Bob computes x = t ⊕ a. Note that Eve learns a only after she has attacked the qubits. Since a is public and independently random, this roundabout way of getting x to Bob is equivalent to the original protocol as far as security is concerned.
EPR version of the protocol
Instead of having Alice prepare a qubit state and Bob measuring it, now Eve prepares a noisy two-qubit EPR state (singlet state) and gives the two subsystems 'A' and 'B' to Alice and Bob respectively. Alice and Bob measure their i'th qubit in basis b i ; this yields s i for Alice and t i for Bob, where t i equals s i plus noise. The s i (or t i ) is random. Alice computes a = s ⊕ x and publishes a in an authenticated way. Bob computes y = t ⊕ a. The rest of the classical processing is the same as in the original protocol, with x =ȳ. Note that the statistics of the variables s, t, a, x, x is the same as in Section 5.1, although the origin of the variables is now different. The equivalence between prepare-and-measure on the one hand and the EPR mechanism on the other hand has been exploited in many works.
Adding a random permutation
After Eve has handed out all n EPR pairs, Alice and Bob publicly agree on a random permutation π. Before performing any measurement they both apply π to their own set of n qubits. Then they forget π. The remainder of the protocol is as in Section 5.2. For Alice and Bob the effect of the permutation is that the noise is distributed differently over the qubits. The error-correction step is insensitive to the location of bit errors; only the number of bit errors matters. Hence all the classical variables that are processed/computed after the error correction step are unaffected by π. The only output variable of the protocol that is affected is a. However, a was a uniform 12 random variable and has now become a different uniform variable; as far as security is concerned, the new protocol is equivalent to the one in Section 5.2. Let E perm denote the protocol containing the random permutation step. In the language of Section 2.3 we can write E perm • π = E perm . (After all, a permutation followed by a random permutation is a random permutation.) We conclude that the post-selection criterion holds and we can apply (2) . Note that E perm needs quantum memory. This has no practical significance, since Alice and Bob actually execute E orig , while E perm is a proof-technical fiction.
Adding random Pauli transforms
This is the trick introduced by [15] . For each individual EPR pair, Alice and Bob publicly agree on a random α ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. They both apply the Pauli transform σ α to their own qubit state, and then forget α. This happens before they do their measurement. The rest of the protocol is as in section 5.3. The mapping in a single qubit position can be written as
The net effect of the Pauli transforms is that the measurement sequence b gets randomized 13 with public randomness; but b was already random, so security-wise nothing has changed. The random-Paulis trick yields a major simplification: For six-state encoding (and higher), only one degree of freedom is left in the description of Eve's state, namely the bit error probability. This was an important ingredient of the security proof in [5] .
Pretending that the authentication tags are unforgeable
We pretend that Eve is unable to forge the authentication tags τ and τ fb , which is true except with probability ≤ 2 · 2 −λ . This has two benefits: (i) We get rid of complicated case-by-case analyses that would allow events where the error correction yields a wrongm,r without warning, whilê τ looks correct; (ii) In the Accept case Bob's reconstructed variablesm,r automatically equal Alice's m, r, thus reducing the number of variables. 
Effect of the modifications
Furthermore, due to the permutation invariance of E mod we can apply the post-selection proof technique and use (2) . Finally, thanks to the random Paulis, the state σ in (2) will have the very simple form that makes it possible to arrive at an expression like (4).
The output state
The Completely Positive Trace Preserving (CPTP) map E mod acts on the 'AB' subsystem (the 2n qubits controlled by Alice and Bob) without affecting the 'E' subsystem. We write
The map I fetches the classical input variables, M is the measurement, P is the classical processing, and T traces away all variables that are not outputs. The input variables are mzbkuv. We have I(ρ ABE ) = E mzbkuv |mzbkuv mzbkuv| ⊗ ρ ABE . 14 Note that all input variables except m are uniform.
The measurement M introduces coupling between the classical b register and the quantum state. Furthermore, it destroys the AB subsystem and creates new classical registers s, t ∈ {0, 1} n .
For the factorised form of ρ ABE it holds that E st (· · · ) = st 2 −n P t|s (· · · ), with P t|s def = γ |s⊕t| (1 − γ) |s⊕t| , where γ is the bit error probability caused by Eve. 13 Let Alice and Bob both perform a projective measurement on their own part ofρ AB in basis |ψ b
x , |ψ b x . This can be rewritten as projective measurements on ρ AB in basis σα|ψ b
x , σα|ψ b x . 14 One can also start from a protocol description E mod that acts on a state |inputs inputs| ⊗ ρ AB , i.e. E mod describes how the protocol acts on the quantum state ρ AB given some value of the classical inputs. The quantity of interest is then E mod acting on a linear combination of input values; this exactly matches the above mapping I. Figure 3 : The modified protocol with EPR states, random permutation, random Pauli transformations and perfect authentication. The notation π stands for a permutation and Σ for a vector of n Pauli matrices.
The processing P introduces the new variables: 15 r is generated randomly, cxayωzb are created by Alice and Bob's computations and q is fetched from the reservoir. Let nβ be the number of bit errors that the error-correcting code can correct. We define the indicator function θ st such that θ st = 1 when |s ⊕ t| ≤ nβ and θ st = 0 otherwise.
The protocol output consists of the classical variables aωmzbuv. The map T traces out all the non-output registers. Applying this trace to (9) yields
In slight abuse of notation we have written 2 −n a = E a , 2 −n z = Ez, |B| −n b = Eb. In (10, 11, 12) we should have formally written ρ
uvbzma , but in the subscript we have kept only the variables on which the state actually has dependence. The idealized version F mod of the protocol is obtained by first executing E mod , then tracing away the message m and the keys uvzb, and finally replacing them with completely random values. 16
The states with label '[ω = 1]' are sub-normalised; we have tr ρ E[ω=1] = P corr and E u tr ρ E[ω=1] ubza = P corr , where we define P corr as the probability that the number of errors can be corrected. In the factorised form of ρ it holds that
Similarly tr ρ E[ω=0] = 1 − P corr and E v tr ρ E[ω=0] vbza = 1 − P corr . Note that when m is uniform, the trace distance of the actual versus the ideal output state has an intuitive meaning as the distance of the keys/seeds from uniformity given Eve's side information,
7 Security Proof
Attacker Model
The attacker model is the standard one in quantum cryptography. No information leaks from the labs of Alice or Bob, i.e. there are no side-channels. Eve fully controls the environment outside Alice and Bob's labs. Eve has unbounded quantum memory and unbounded (quantum-)computational resources. Eve's measurements are noiseless.
Forward secrecy
Equations (10) and (13) serve as the starting point for the security proof. Note that the expression (13) is also obtained if M is not traced away; consequently the analysis of known-plaintext and unknown-plaintext attacks turns out to be identical, just as was the case in [5] . An even stronger result holds: In (10) the M is entirely decoupled from Eve's (classical and quantum) side information and from the next-round variables U VZB. Hence our protocol has forward secrecy: a compromise of the updated keys has no impact on the secrecy of the message µ [16]. 
Main result: upper bound on the diamond norm
The min{· · · } term is the same as in (3) . We conclude that the asymptotic rate ( /n) equals 1 − h({1 − 3 2 γ, γ 2 , γ 2 , γ 2 }), as mentioned in Section 2.4. The term 1 2 √ |Q| dictates that, in order to have α bits of security, we have to set log |Q| > 30 log(n + 1) − 2 + 2α. Hence in case of Reject the amount of expended key material is n − 1 + 30 log(n + 1) + λ + 2α. Asymptotically this is n[1 + O( log n n )].
Proof of Theorem 7.1: The term 2 −λ+1 comes from the transition from E orig to E mod . The factor (n + 1) 15 comes from applying the postselection theorem (2) . For bounding the trace norm (E mod − F mod )(ρ ABE ) 1 , we start from (10), (13) and use the fact that the eigenvalue problem reduces to an individual eigenvalue problem for each value of the classical variables, orthogonal to the other values. We get 
The second bound on D acc takes some more work. We introduce smoothing of ρ as in [15, 11, 17] , allowing statesρ that are ε-close to ρ in the sense of trace distance. We have D acc ≤ 2ε + D acc , with D acc = E uvmzba ρ . Next we evaluate the expression under the square root, making use of the properties of the pairwise would require either (a) a source of public randomness that is not known by Eve beforehand, e.g. a broadcast; or (b) communication of u from Alice to Bob or the other way round. The former involves nontrivial logistics, while the latter violates the aims of this paper. In the Accept case the reservoir of shared key material remains untouched. In the Reject case the number of bits expended from the reservoir is n + O(log n). Asymptotically, in the noiseless case (n → + κ, κ → 0), this expenditure is very close to the optimum value [2] . (It is not possible to protect an -bit message information-theoretically with less than bits of key expenditure.) We have not done anything about the classical feedback from Bob to Alice. It cannot be removed, because Alice needs to know if Bob correctly received her message. On the other hand, one can consider a scenario where Alice and Bob are both senders, in an alternating way. Then the feedback bit can be placed inside the next message, resulting in a fully quantum conversation.
There is one drawback to the protocol described in this paper. It is bad at dealing with erasures. As the actual message (as opposed to a random string) is encoded in the quantum state, absorption of qubits in the quantum channel has to be compensated in the error-correcting code. The effect of erasures on the rate is severe. A solution as proposed in [5] would imply that the message is no longer encoded directly in the qubits; instead Alice sends a random string to Bob, part of which survives the channel and gets used to derive an OTP. Such a solution does not satisfy the aims of this paper. As a topic for future work we mention finite-size analysis, e.g. smoothing without taking the limit n → ∞.
